Being Fair In Evaluating Belichick’s Decision

I didn’t start off with the greatest opinion of ESPN’s Colin Cowherd. I had heard, albeit belatedly, about his stunt in shutting down The Big Lead because of some perceived slight. This seemed like a petty, malicious, and extreme thing to do in a business that requires awfully thick skin. In recent months, however, I’ve softened my stance on Cowherd. His occasional interviews with Keith Law have drawn me to his show, and from these interviews I’ve decided that Cowherd isn’t the total schmuck I thought he was. He can be a little overbearing at times and he’s clearly impressed with himself, but I think he’s a sharp guy with some interesting opinions.

As I do with increasing frequency, I had Cowherd’s radio show on in the background as I did some work this morning. The topic of discussion, unsurprisingly, was Bill Belichick’s controversial decision in last night’s Patriots-Colts game. With a 34-28 lead and 2:08 remaining, the Patriots went for it on 4th and 2 from their own 28-yard line. They were stopped just short of the marker, allowing Peyton Manning and the Colts to take over possession deep in Patriots territory. The Colts ultimately won the game on the ensuing drive, creating nothing short of total uproar about Belichick’s decision. Like many of his peers, Cowherd hated the gamble, but isn’t buying the idea that Belichick’s skills are slipping or that the Patriots’ defense will remember this perceived slight for the rest of the season.

Cowherd then got an e-mail from a listener, who presented statistics that supported Belichick’s seemingly insane decision to go for it. I’ve forgotten the actual numbers, but it was something like teams should go for it in that situation more than 70% of the time. I was thrilled that these numbers were brought to Cowherd’s (and his huge audience’s) attention, because they touch on what is fast-becoming my newest sports crusade. In general, I think offenses are way too conservative on fourth down. Coaches are too quick to call for a punt or field goal attempt, when chances are they could get the yard or two necessary for a new set of downs. There’s a passing similarity here to closer usage in baseball. In baseball, many managers are convinced that the last three outs in a game are harder to get than the previous 24, thereby necessitating the development and use of a special reliever equipped with the special ability to get these special outs: the closer. While football’s analogue isn’t quite as extreme, it does seem like coaches are convinced that those two or three yards on fourth down are harder to get than most other yards in a game. So, they punt it or kick a field goal. Both tactics – closer deployment and kicking or punting – stem from a misguided belief, as well as fear of public criticism if their solid thought process yields an unfavorable result.

With that being said, I was interested in what Cowherd would say when confronted with these statistics. He’s one of the more open-minded talking heads out there, so I thought maybe he’d change his tune a little. Instead, Cowherd paid lip service to the probabilities and the general usefulness of statistics, but called these particular numbers “disingenuous.” He said that statistics must be taken in their proper context (which is true), and that the context in the Patriots-Colts game essentially rendered the probabilities useless. Cowherd said that the numbers don’t tell us game situations, and that in last night’s case, the mitigating factor was where the Patriots chose to go for it, not that they chose to go for it. It wasn’t the call itself that Cowherd disliked. It was where the call was made (on the Patriots own 28-yard line) that was problematic.

I’m still not sure if I agree with Cowherd or not, but I think it’s pretty disingenuous to call the listener’s statistics “disingenuous.” Upon receiving these numbers, Cowherd basically made an argument for considering context when evaluating statistics or probabilities. Well, it seems to me that Cowherd himself is ignoring a significant bit of context that might the probabilities more admissible in his eyes. If the Patriots punted the ball (as convention dictates), that gives Peyton Manning two minutes to drive sixty to seventy yards at home. This is the same Peyton Manning who has thrown for 48,500 yards and 353 touchdowns in his career, completing passes at a 65% clip. He’s having one of the finest seasons of his career this year, based largely on his 69.7% (!) completion percentage. I’m positive that this was a huge factor in Belichick’s thought process. The Patriots had a chance to win the game right there, and they went for it because of the quality of their offense and the quality of their opponent’s offense. If Cowherd is going to advocate decision-making based on the careful balance of probabilities and context, then that’s wonderful. But it’s just as disingenuous to ignore the quality of the opponent’s offense as it is to ignore the chances of converting on 4th and 2.

I think I just talked myself into liking Belichick’s call. Keep on fighting the good fight, arrogant coach of a team I loathe.

EDIT: Here are the numbers that the listener was most likely looking at, as linked to by ESPN’s Rob Neyer (of all people). Right now, NFL analyst and former quarterback Trent Dilfer is lambasting Belichick’s decision because it wasn’t as “calculated” as those made by Dilfer’s former coach, Tony Dungy. How ironic is it that Belichick probably made his choice based on these probabilities, and he’s being blasted for not being “calculated” enough?

Is Bobby Bowden Too Old To Coach?

Over the past few months, I’ve become intermittently aware of the unrest surrounding Florida State’s football team. Apparently, prominent alumni and program boosters are upset at the state of the program, going so far as to call for 80-year-old head coach Bobby Bowden’s resignation. College football isn’t really my thing (unless I’m watching Vanderbilt lose by 20 every week), so I’ve remained mostly agnostic about this controversy. I like I think that I see both sides of the issue. Bowden is an iconic figure in college football, and even more so in the annals of Florida State athletics. But he’s old – let’s call it what it is – and it’s not ridiculous to suggest that his age may adversely affect the football program. I could see either side of the argument, but that was before Bowden went and did this.

If this is true (and no reason to doubt its veracity), then it’s a pretty big blow to Bowden’s credibility. Whether it’s fair or not, the head coach of any team, much less a storied one like Florida State, must be able to remember basic information about the flow of the game. We all have bouts of forgetfulness, and that this bout occurred to Bowden at the age of 80 when questions about his professional legitimacy are being asked is more than a little sad. But two things remain unquestionable: this is an embarrassing development, and it lends at least a small amount of credibility to the idea that Bowden needs to retire.

My opinion on this matter is not clear-cut, primarily because it would be based on the collision of two tightly-held personal tenets. Above all else, I believe in randomness and sample size. It’s possible that Bowden’s brainlock was an example of the sort of forgetfulness that occurs to us in our daily lives. It’s quite likely that a 30-year-old head coach could make the same mistake. We forget things sometimes. Maybe Bowden just had the 1996 Brady Anderson season of post-game comments. I believe that stuff happens, and that you can’t draw a sound conclusion until you have enough of that stuff to sort through. But I also believe that our faculties decline as we get older. Actually, it’s not so much a belief as it is a fact. We decline as we get older. Our eyesight gets worse, our knees and back hurt, our hearing goes, we repeat ourselves, and we forget bits of information with greater frequency. It’s just what happens.

As understanding as I am of this process, it doesn’t exempt the aging from a certain amount of scrutiny or criticism. This is especially true if the individual is holding a prominent, influential, or lucrative position – much like the one Bobby Bowden currently holds. There should be no special treatment of the elderly in the workforce. If they can perform the duties of the job to their fullest extent, then fine, the position is filled based on merit. But if age or factors stemming from aging make this task difficult, then criticism is warranted. Of course, the tough part is figuring out which professional deficiencies are effects of age and which would be there no matter what.

I have no idea whether Bobby Bowden is actually fit to run a football team or not. But I do know that most of the 80-year-olds out there aren’t working; they’re retired. And their overwhelming retirement isn’t some sprawling coincidence. They’re retired because they’ve worked a long time, they’re too tired and/or underqualified to keep doing so, and they deserve to relax. With that being the case, it’s nothing like prepostrous to suggest that Bowden is no longer the optimal choice for his job. Especially if he keeps on forgetting what just happened.

Want To Be Recognized As An Elite Defender? Become An Exceptional Hitter

The 2009 AL Gold Glove winners have been announced. Do you notice a pattern? If you don’t, perhaps my inclusion of each player’s 2009 OPS+ will give it away:

• C – Joe Mauer (170)
• 1B – Mark Teixeira (149)
• 2B – Placido Polanco (88)
• 3B – Evan Longoria (130)
• SS – Derek Jeter (132)
• OF – Ichiro Suzuki (127)
• OF – Torii Hunter (126)
• OF – Adam Jones (106)

As you can see, six of the eight winners are exceptional hitters. One is above average, and another is mediocre. Nevertheless, the voters would have you believe that not only are these players incredible offensive forces, they are elite defenders as well. Is this possible? Sure. Some guys have all the luck. Is this probable? Not at all, especially because we can quantify defensive ability better than ever before.

If Gold Gloves were awarded based solely on defensive merit (as is the stated purpose of the award), the recipients should have been:

• C – Gerald Laird (64)
• 1B – Kendry Morales (137)
• 2B – Dustin Pedroia (110)
• 3B – Evan Longoria (130)
• SS – Elvis Andrus (82)
• OF – Ichiro Suzuki (127)
• OF - Franklin Gutierrez (103)
• OF – Carl Crawford (113)

The more I think about Gold Glove voting, the more irritated I get. I can’t profess genuine surprise that the recipients are superior hitters; this has almost always been the case. What really gets me is that the voters sometimes appear to ignore defensive measurements altogether when choosing the best defenders. For example, Gerald Laird had as many errors as Joe Mauer in 2009 and threw out base-stealers at a much higher rate. Ah, but look at Mauer’s offensive numbers! He gets the award. Cy Young and MVP voting may be flawed, but at least the voters look at pitching and hitting statistics when making their selections – however useless those statistics might be. If Cy Young voting worked the same way Gold Glove voting does, selections would be based on how well the pitcher hits.

Gold Glove awards should go to the best defenders, period. Until that happens, I think I might have just convinced myself that this award is the biggest sham in sports.

 

This, Is A Great Impression… Of Ron Jaworski

I have mere minutes before friends arrive and we spend all day watching college football, but I must share with you this amazing clip. It’s the Houston Texans’ David Anderson doing a fantastic impression of ESPN’s resident football nerd (that’s a compliment), Ron Jaworski. Jaworski’s breakdown of film on “NFL Live” is unique not only because of the great insight he provides, but also because of the bizarre cadences and speech patterns he uses when doing so. Anderson mimics this perfectly, and it’s hilarious to watch. Enjoy.

 

27

The New York Yankees are your 2009 World Series Champions.

I’ll be back with much more much later (a close friend from college will be in town through Sunday). But for now, I can’t tell you how happy I am for Alex Rodriguez and Hideki Matsui. Rodriguez… well, we all know what he’s been through, and if you’ve read this space regularly, you know how much I think it was undeserved. He’s an all-time great, he works hard, and he clearly cares (too much, it sometimes appears). Of course, he made a mistake, but the criticism he received (like most steroid-entangled players) was not proportionate to the transgression. Why no one likes the guy, I’ll never understand. I’m thrilled he dispensed with the idea that he’s a team-killer, a choker, and a loser. Good for him.

It seems less and less likely that Hideki Matsui will be on the 2010 Yankees. Even for a cold-hearted crank who sees players as little more than a series of statistics and probabilities (this is 45% true), Matsui’s probable departure tugs at the heartstrings. He was never the best player on the Yankees, never quite lived up to the ridiculous “Godzilla!” hype, but the guy did nothing but hit for seven seasons. He continued that trend in the World Series, hitting .615/.643/1.385 and winning the series MVP. What a way to go out.

Until next time, when you’ll learn more about my hair than you ever wanted to know.

Bad A.J.

As much as I’d love to pin the blame on bad management or shoddy umpiring, there’s nothing else I can really say about this one – Bad A.J. showed up. Burnett had his worst start of the season, “lasting” two innings and allowing six runs. His performance was bolstered (and not in a good way) by the efforts of reliever Phil Coke, who allowed two home runs to two of the three lefties he was brought in to face. It’s hard to score six runs and lose the game, but that’s what happened to the Yankees.

I can’t leave, however, without complaining about at least one thing. The A.J. Burnett-Jose Molina tandem has worked to the tune of a 5.27 ERA this postseason. It’s sort of irrelevant at this point, because Burnett will not be making another start, but it’s worth mentioning. It’s worth mentioning because of the ridiculous idea that Molina’s presence improves Burnett’s performance enough to overcome the crippling effect of Molina’s bat in the lineup. It doesn’t. Next year, put Posada back there (warts and all), and hope for the best.

 

One Win Away

And much of it can be attributed to Chokey McChokeartist himself, Alex Rodriguez. Here’s to Good A.J. tonight.

“If We’re Nice, We’ll Let It Go Six”

On October 26th, Phillies shortstop Jimmy Rollins predicted that his team would beat the Yankees to win the World Series in five games. Ever munificent, Rollins allowed for the possibility that the series could go six games, but the result would remain the same: a second World Series victory in as many years for the Phillies.

Well, it would appear that Rollins and his teammates were feeling charitable last night, as the Yankees’ 8-5 win ensured that if the Phillies win the World Series, it would be in six or seven games. Generally, I’m not opposed to predictions and other forms of competitive banter. Cincinnati Bengals’ receiver Chad Ochocinco’s checklist is a personal favorite because of its originality and the man’s very real ability to back it up. Rollins’ prediction, however, slightly irked me because of his performance. Rollins hit a miserable .250/.296/.423 in the regular season, making him roughly the 11th-most valuable member of the 2009 Phillies, behind the immortal Carlos Ruiz and barely ahead of Pedro Feliz. Yes, Rollins has a ring and a handful of good seasons to his name, but it must be mentioned that Rollins has been a below-average hitter (97 OPS+) and average-ish fielder (4.9 UZR/150) in his career. Talk is all well and good, but the crank in me believes it should be in proportion to the individual accomplishments of its instigator.

A few remaining thoughts from the game:

• Alex Rodriguez hit a controversial home run and was hit by a couple pitches, bringing his World Series OPS up to .708. Phillies’ slugger Ryan Howard, on the other hand, went 0-for-4 with three strikeouts an a pop-up, making him 2/13 this World Series with nine strikeouts. Trust me when I say that using World Series OPS to make a point makes me want to throw myself off a bridge, but I have to ask: Will we see a national columnist write about Howard’s inability to handle the pressure? Will people question his fortitude and focus? In short, will he (or Mark Teixeira, he of the .607 postseason OPS) get the Alex Rodriguez treatment? No, they will not, because people like Howard and Teixeira, and Rodriguez (for whatever reason) rubs people the wrong way. I know I should get over this double standard, but I simply refuse to.

• For much of the evening, Andy Pettitte drove me nuts. I watched him hold the top of the Phillies’ order to 1/15 with one walk and five strikeouts (Chase Utley twice and Ryan Howard three times). Then I watched him allow the bottom of their order to go 3/11, including a double to Pedro Feliz (.308 OBP), two walks to Carlos Ruiz, and a bunt single to pitcher Cole Hamels. Having slept on it, I’m not longer flustered by Pettitte’s performance. While the two homers to Jayson Werth here tough to swallow, Pettitte did fantastic work against most of the Phillies’ toughest hitters. Holding Utley, Howard, and Raul Ibanez hitless with seven strikeouts is awfully difficult to do, but he did it. This is me tipping my cap. Now stop walking bad hitters.

• Try as I might, I simply can’t resist mentioning another bit of stupid (yes, that word is what I mean) bullpen management. Up 8-4 entering the bottom of the ninth inning, Joe Girardi sent out Phil Hughes to finish up the game. I liked the move; Hughes typically sees action in high-leverage situations, but his postseason struggles warranted his use at the start of an inning, with a significant lead, and a clean slate. Hughes retired the first batter he faced on a ground ball. Then, to his absolute discredit, he allowed a home run to Carlos Ruiz. Unfortunately for Hughes and people with brains everywhere, Ruiz’s homer made the game a save situation. And we all know what that means with Mariano Rivera in the bullpen and Girardi in charge. Rivera entered the game, retired the next two batters, and secured the victory. This was just another example of thoughtless, push-button management. If the Yankees don’t have another reliever that can get two outs before surrendering three runs (they have several), their team is hugely flawed. If Girardi doesn’t believe that he has another reliever that can do that, he’s an idiot. With Rivera coming off two innings pitched in Game Two and C.C. Sabathia going on short rest tonight, Girardi should have used literally any reliever but Rivera in that situation (how about, you know, leaving Hughes in there and not messing with his head like that?). The Yankees could very well need Rivera for an extended appearance tonight, and his usage last night might have sunk that possibility.

1-1

Before last night’s game, I meant to post something like the following:

I just can’t shake the feeling that Bad A.J. will be showing up tonight. The Phillies are patient and Burnett is wild anyway, which is not a good combination. I also can’t shake the feeling that Pedro Martinez is going to junkball his way through six scoreless innings in his return to the Bronx. I would love to be wrong in both cases.

I was mostly wrong, and I couldn’t be happier. Burnett struck out nine and walked two in seven innings of outstanding work. Martinez’s performance (6 IP, 3 ER, 2 BB, 8 K) seemed pedestrian by comparison, but he really was in control for most of his outing. Both pitchers were pleasures to watch, even if I was actively rooting for Pedro’s rehabilitated shoulder to fall off.

On a less heartening note, the front page of ESPN.com has a “story” about Alex Rodriguez’s 0-for-8 performance so far in the World Series. You can get to it by clicking the image captioned “A-Rod’s Struggles.” You can probably imagine how I feel about this, but I want to point how just how stupid (and really, there is no other word for it) this article is. The article basically consists of Yankee players saying “it’s only eight at-bats”, “he’s the reason we’re here”, and “we’re not worried”, while Gene Wojciechowski retorts with “they can dress it up all they want, but A-Rod is choking.” It’s utter nonsense, and I’m profoundly disappointed that it took eight (EIGHT!) unproductive at-bats for national columnists to start readying the torches and pitchforks.

Go get ‘em in Game Three, boys.

Starting Chad Gaudin Is Just Asking For Trouble

Perhaps this is just selective memory, but the 2009 World Series seems to be coming together rather tidily. The narrative is clear, with the defending champion Phillies facing a Yankees team that is hungry to reclaim what was once regularly theirs. The primary talking point is simple: both teams are offensive powerhouses, and whichever team keeps the damage to a minimum will prevail. Generally, there seems to be little drama (although Pedro Martinez pitching Game Two at Yankee Stadium is pretty great) or intrigue.

Of course, as a neurotic Yankees fan (redundant?), this is unacceptable to me. It is my duty to find something either to fret about or something to caution as underestimated in its importance. Luckily, I have found both in the person of Yankees starting pitcher Chad Gaudin. Manager Joe Girardi and his staff are toying with the idea of giving Gaudin a start in Game Four or Five, thereby preventing C.C. Sabathia, Andy Pettitte, and A.J. Burnett from pitching on short rest throughout the series. Unsurprisingly, since he hasn’t pitched since October 3rd, there have been reports of Gaudin being “stretched out” for a possible start. As you may have guessed, I think starting Gaudin is a terrible idea, and for a different reason than you’ve probably heard most opponents of the idea cite.

Chad Gaudin’s chronic inability to retire left-handed hitters is a huge reason for concern. Since 2002, lefties have hit .293/.389/.433 against Gaudin (righties: .249/.318/.409). Even more starkly, Gaudin’s career K/BB against lefties is 0.84, as opposed to 2.80 against righties. These trends held true in the 2009 season as well. Lefties hit .296/.408/.415 against him, walking one more time than they struck out. Gaudin’s problems against lefties are not a prolonged fluke. They are a real problem, chronicled in real data over a significant sample size.

This deficiency wouldn’t be worth so much thought if the Yankees were playing a balanced or heavily right-handed team. The Phillies, however, get a great deal of their offense from left-handed hitters. Ryan Howard, Chase Utley, and Raul Ibanez form the heart of the Phillies’ lineup (righty Jayson Werth is mixed in there), and they are preceded by switch-hitters Jimmy Rollins and Shane Victorino. Here are each of their numbers against right-handed pitchers, both career and in 2009:

• Ryan Howard: .307/.409/.661 (career), .319/.395/.691 (2009)
• Chase Utley: .302/.375/.536 (career), .279/.387/.489 (2009)
• Raul Ibanez: .290/.354/.496, (career), .267/.342/.517 (2009)
• Jimmy Rollins: .272/.327/.435 (career), .257/.306/.422 (2009)
• Shane Victorino: .287/.347/.415 (career), .283/.347/.440 (2009)

The greatest concern of these five hitters is Ryan Howard. As I’ve mentioned before, Howard is the best hitter of right-handed pitching in baseball, and among the very worst against lefties. This factor alone should make the Yankees think twice about starting a fringy right-hander like Chad Gaudin. It gets worse. Utley murders major league pitching of either handedness, making Gaudin’s difficulty with lefties even more problematic. Interestingly, Ibanez posted a significant reverse split in 2009, destroying left-handers and hitting acceptably against righties. Even if this is a real change in Ibanez’s performance (which it isn’t), Gaudin turns average left-handed hitters (like 2009 Ibanez) into above-average ones because of his significant control problems against them. Starting Gaudin against these three hitters is just asking for trouble.

To be fair, Jimmy Rollins’ and Shane Victorino’s numbers against right-handers aren’t overwhelmingly impressive. In fact, both switch-hitters are stronger against lefties. But it isn’t their ability to put the bat on the ball against Gaudin that worries me. Instead, I’m fairly certain that Rollins and Victorino will draw walks. Rollins has never had a great eye, but he walks more against righties than lefties. Victorino walks more against lefties than righties, but has decent plate discipline overall. Ultimately, it’s not hard at all to envision Gaudin starting the game by walking one or both of them (Rollins leads off, Victorino bats second), and then having to retire the slugging, lefty-heavy heart of the order with runners on base. It’s a terrifying prospect that should never come to pass.

I understand why the Yankees would consider giving Gaudin a start; having Sabathia, Burnett, and Pettitte pitching on short rest for half the series is a tough alternative to face. This is, however, the World Series. A team must go with nothing but its best in all but the most hopeless of circumstances, and Gaudin is not the Yankees’ best. If the Yankees opt to give him a start (a decision that is still very much up in the air), they are essentially choosing to neutralize Werth, Pedro Feliz, and Carlos Ruiz, while taking their chances with Howard, Utley, and Ibanez. That looks an awful lot like a bad idea to me under any circumstances, but particularly so when the stakes cannot get any higher.