“If We’re Nice, We’ll Let It Go Six”

On October 26th, Phillies shortstop Jimmy Rollins predicted that his team would beat the Yankees to win the World Series in five games. Ever munificent, Rollins allowed for the possibility that the series could go six games, but the result would remain the same: a second World Series victory in as many years for the Phillies.

Well, it would appear that Rollins and his teammates were feeling charitable last night, as the Yankees’ 8-5 win ensured that if the Phillies win the World Series, it would be in six or seven games. Generally, I’m not opposed to predictions and other forms of competitive banter. Cincinnati Bengals’ receiver Chad Ochocinco’s checklist is a personal favorite because of its originality and the man’s very real ability to back it up. Rollins’ prediction, however, slightly irked me because of his performance. Rollins hit a miserable .250/.296/.423 in the regular season, making him roughly the 11th-most valuable member of the 2009 Phillies, behind the immortal Carlos Ruiz and barely ahead of Pedro Feliz. Yes, Rollins has a ring and a handful of good seasons to his name, but it must be mentioned that Rollins has been a below-average hitter (97 OPS+) and average-ish fielder (4.9 UZR/150) in his career. Talk is all well and good, but the crank in me believes it should be in proportion to the individual accomplishments of its instigator.

A few remaining thoughts from the game:

• Alex Rodriguez hit a controversial home run and was hit by a couple pitches, bringing his World Series OPS up to .708. Phillies’ slugger Ryan Howard, on the other hand, went 0-for-4 with three strikeouts an a pop-up, making him 2/13 this World Series with nine strikeouts. Trust me when I say that using World Series OPS to make a point makes me want to throw myself off a bridge, but I have to ask: Will we see a national columnist write about Howard’s inability to handle the pressure? Will people question his fortitude and focus? In short, will he (or Mark Teixeira, he of the .607 postseason OPS) get the Alex Rodriguez treatment? No, they will not, because people like Howard and Teixeira, and Rodriguez (for whatever reason) rubs people the wrong way. I know I should get over this double standard, but I simply refuse to.

• For much of the evening, Andy Pettitte drove me nuts. I watched him hold the top of the Phillies’ order to 1/15 with one walk and five strikeouts (Chase Utley twice and Ryan Howard three times). Then I watched him allow the bottom of their order to go 3/11, including a double to Pedro Feliz (.308 OBP), two walks to Carlos Ruiz, and a bunt single to pitcher Cole Hamels. Having slept on it, I’m not longer flustered by Pettitte’s performance. While the two homers to Jayson Werth here tough to swallow, Pettitte did fantastic work against most of the Phillies’ toughest hitters. Holding Utley, Howard, and Raul Ibanez hitless with seven strikeouts is awfully difficult to do, but he did it. This is me tipping my cap. Now stop walking bad hitters.

• Try as I might, I simply can’t resist mentioning another bit of stupid (yes, that word is what I mean) bullpen management. Up 8-4 entering the bottom of the ninth inning, Joe Girardi sent out Phil Hughes to finish up the game. I liked the move; Hughes typically sees action in high-leverage situations, but his postseason struggles warranted his use at the start of an inning, with a significant lead, and a clean slate. Hughes retired the first batter he faced on a ground ball. Then, to his absolute discredit, he allowed a home run to Carlos Ruiz. Unfortunately for Hughes and people with brains everywhere, Ruiz’s homer made the game a save situation. And we all know what that means with Mariano Rivera in the bullpen and Girardi in charge. Rivera entered the game, retired the next two batters, and secured the victory. This was just another example of thoughtless, push-button management. If the Yankees don’t have another reliever that can get two outs before surrendering three runs (they have several), their team is hugely flawed. If Girardi doesn’t believe that he has another reliever that can do that, he’s an idiot. With Rivera coming off two innings pitched in Game Two and C.C. Sabathia going on short rest tonight, Girardi should have used literally any reliever but Rivera in that situation (how about, you know, leaving Hughes in there and not messing with his head like that?). The Yankees could very well need Rivera for an extended appearance tonight, and his usage last night might have sunk that possibility.

I Understand So Little

I could write four thousand words about the Yankees’ 7-6 loss to the Angels last night. In virtually every respect, it was a gut-wrenching game to watch. Bad A.J. showed up. There was more suspect umpiring. There were real rallies and near rallies. Many runners were left on base. The bullpen management (like I can go two consecutive posts without mentioning this) was terrible. It was just a long and hard game to watch, the sort of game that I’m pretty sure cut ten or fifteen minutes off my life.

Another cranky manifesto seems masochistic to me, so I’ll just pose all the questions that were running through my head throughout the game. Maybe one of you can shed some light on the answer, because I understand very little of the following:

• Why must the Yankees continue to start Jose Molina when A.J. Burnett pitches? And, given that they’re intent on doing this, why let Molina even hit in the top of the 3rd inning, when you’re already down 4-0? The Yankees reaped no benefits from his allegedly strong relationship with Burnett, and then let him hit. What’s the point?

• On the heels of an incredible six-run rally, why send Burnett out for the bottom of the 7th inning? And, given that they did that, why warm up Damaso Marte and Joba Chamberlain as your backup plan? If Burnett is out, that means he allowed baserunners, and Marte (terrible) and Chamberlain (trouble throwing strikes) are not reliever you want to deploy with runners on base.

• Where is David Robertson? Why not send Robertson out for the 7th inning? It could go Robertson (7th), Phil Hughes (8th), Mariano Rivera (9th), with each reliever fitting neatly into the stupid but conventional role system that managers love so much. Of course, the right move was to send out Rivera for the 7th and 8th, but it’s clear at this point that that’s asking too much.

• I’m still not done with this Robertson thing. Why are Hughes and Chamberlain both so clearly ahead of Robertson on Joe Girardi’s Totem Pole of Trust? Is it because Girardi thinks Robertson is a kid and not ready for the big moment? He got out of that bases loaded, nobody out jam against the Twins. He’s also older than Hughes and Chamberlain. Is it because Girardi thinks Robertson is worse than them? Chamberlain had a 4.75 ERA this season in 157 innings; Hughes had a 3.03 in 86. Look at Robertson’s numbers and tell me that he isn’t worthy of a shot. Is it because Robertson – through no fault of his own – has never before been branded as a baseball team’s set-up man (as Hughes and Chamberlain have), making him an unrealistic option with a late lead? I fear that’s exactly what it is.

• Why use Rivera when down 7-6 in the 8th, but not when tied 6-6 in the 7th? Is it because the number in the innings column is “7″ and not “8″ or “9″? I fear that’s exactly what it is.

• Down one run with two outs in the top of the 9th, why pinch-run for Alex Rodriguez at first, and then not send the runner? Once again, Girardi did something just because he could, and not because it was the right move.

I just don’t get this game sometimes.

Mariano Rivera’s Cy Young Candidacy Relies On The Overvaluing Of Closers

A little over a week ago, I offered my opinion about who should win the American League’s Most Valuable Player award. In a roundabout sort of way, and after wondering why Kevin Youkilis hasn’t garnered more support, I said it’s clear that Minnesota’s Joe Mauer is most deserving of the honor. In fact, this is the rare race in which there is an unquestionably right answer; Mauer is the league’s most valuable player, and if you think otherwise, you are wrong. Baseball Prospectus’ Joe Sheehan agrees with me, even if he is more optimistic than I am about the voters ultimately choosing Mauer. In any case, I no longer feel compelled to participate in this particular debate (unless he doesn’t win, in which case you will most certainly be hearing from me).

I hadn’t thought much about the American League Cy Young award race until last night. I was watching the MLB Network when former player-turned-analyst Dan Plesac said something very closely resembling the following:

“I’ll tell you what, Mariano Rivera should be in the thick of the Cy Young discussion. He’s simply the best ever at his position and he’s having another great season. To have a guy that can come in and get the twenty-sixth, twenty-sev… uh, the last few outs of the game every time, that’s a huge advantage for a team. I know there’s the Rolaids award for relief pitchers, but he should be in the Cy Young discussion.”

After chuckling at Plesac’s struggle to remember the number of outs typically required for a baseball game to end, I paused to consider his opinion. Then I rejected it.

As I’ve mentioned several times, 70 innings of brilliant pitching are not as valuable to a team as 200 innings of excellent pitching. One time, I was condescendingly instructed “not to think of it as innings pitched, but as appearances, as the number of games a player can affect” (had this person written his suggestion, I’m positive he would have written “effect”). This is also wrong. A team must throw a minimum of 1,458 innings to make it through a baseball season. You can divide the pitchers up into however many appearances you’d like, but the minimum number of innings is static. Wouldn’t you rather have 15% of those innings soaked up by an excellent pitcher, instead of 5% by a brilliant one? Especially when that 5% is often against the bad part of a lineup with a three-run lead? This is why I disregard relief pitchers as Cy Young candidates. Unless the reliever throws 100 brilliant, high-stakes innings (no, the 9th inning does not automatically qualify), he’s not qualified to win the award.

Mariano Rivera’s proposed candidacy gets even more dubious when you look at the numbers themselves. Look at Rivera’s key statistics compared to the two most qualified Cy Young award candidates, Zach Greinke and Felix Hernandez:

• Rivera: 53 IP, 1.87 ERA, 1.0 HR/9, 1.5 BB/9, 10.0 K/9
• Greinke: 173.1 IP, 2.44 ERA, 0.5 HR/9, 2.0 BB/9, 9.5 K/9
• Hernandez: 178.1 IP, 2.73 ERA, 0.7 HR/9, 2.7 BB/9, 8.7 K/9

Greinke and Hernandez (the former in particular) have performed about as well as Rivera, but in three times as many innings pitched. That has much greater value to a team than Rivera’s small but brilliant contribution.

I think there’s no chance of Rivera actually winning the award, so I’m not as worked up about this as Mauer’s candidacy. But I think Plesac’s misguided opinion of closers’ contributions to a team is fairly common and needed rebutting. A good starter is more valuable than a great closer, period. Assuming Mauer wins the AL MVP award, I hope that this realization is the next frontier in Cy Young voting.

Fan Interference’s 2009 MLB All-Stars: American League

Ever since the end of my childhood (this occurred around 2000), I’ve watched Major League Baseball’s All-Star Game with less awe and more conviction. My interest in the game has become more self-righteous as I root for the game’s more overrated players to fail and the under-appreciated stars to succeed; or, in last year’s case, I root for the game to end. Not all inclinations are based on my ongoing quest for the accurate evaluation and perception of players. Yankees receive cheers no matter what, Red Sox remain vilified – that goes for any Met not named Carlos Beltran, too.

I find the All-Star selection process much more interesting than the game itself. Fans, players, and managers contribute to varying degrees in setting the 33-man roster. Each group – much like any group – has its idiots, its intelligent voters, and a group that falls somewhere between the two. Ultimately, the final rosters provide a useful glimpse into which players embody the intersection of popularity and skill. As you might expect, I prefer that the selectors look at the latter almost to the total exclusion of the former. More difficult is the question of which player is more deserving: the one-half wonder, or the (probably) more talented player with a consistent track record? I lean more towards the established player, although certain cases allow for the rewarding of an incredible first half, even if it is unlikely or unsustainable. There’s a fair argument on both sides.

Now that I’ve bored you with my philosophical musings, I’d like to share my picks for the American League’s 33-man roster. The actual roster can be found here, although they do not yet include the winner of the Final Vote. I’m loosely following the prescribed format: eight starting position players, 13 pitchers (distributed arbitrarily between starters and relievers), and 12 bench players (with a backup at each position). The National League will follow in the coming days. Here we go:

More Puzzling Bullpen Management

This afternoon’s Twins-Yankees game featured yet another bit of puzzling bullpen management. The Yankees had a 3-2 lead going into the top of the 8th inning. With the Twins’ 3-4-5 hitters due up, Yankees manager Joe Girardi elected to leave Phil Coke in the game after he entered in the 7th. Naturally, I was incensed because it was the optimal time to use Mariano Rivera.

(A-Rod hits a walk-off homer. I jump around jubilantly, debate whether or not to continue complaining, and decide that I will.)

Equally naturally, Coke gave up two runs and the lead shifted to 4-3 in favor of the Twins. The Yankees then tied the game up in the bottom of the 8th, and Girardi brought in Rivera to pitch the 9th. Fine. The game goes into extra innings. Fine. Rivera comes out to pitch the 10th. Fi… wait, what?

If Rivera was available to pitch two innings, then why didn’t he pitch the 8th when the Yankees had a slim lead against the heart of the order? It’s a troubling logical inconsistency, and I can’t think of a good explanation for Girardi’s curious decisions.

Modern Bullpen Management Hurts Teams’ Chances Of Victory

 

Under modern bullpen management, elite relievers like Mariano Rivera are regularly misused.

 

This afternoon’s Indians-Yankees game featured yet another example of how modern bullpen management is broken. I’ve written about this before, but the idealistic side of me seems to think that I can affect change by blogging about it. So, less than one week later, I’m back at it again.

The catastrophe began in the top of the 7th inning, with the game tied at one. Yankees manager Joe Girardi brought reliever Jose Veras in to start the inning against Cleveland’s 2-3-4 hitters – roughly the toughest part of the batting order. I would have used another reliever (you can probably guess who), but I’ve totally abandoned any hope of managers using their nominal closer to start any inning that isn’t the 9th. As a result, I accepted Girardi’s decision and hoped for the best. Of course, my hope and faith were immediately crushed when Veras walks Mark DeRosa and allows Victor Martinez to double. It’s still a 1-1 game in the 7th, but there are runners on second and third with no one out. The outcome of the game probably rests on the Yankees’ ability to squirm out of this, particularly given the Indians’ strong bullpen.

Like every manager in baseball, Joe Girardi intuitively understands the importance of this situation, but does not act on it. Cleanup hitter Jhonny Peralta (not a typo, for those new to the game) doubled, scoring DeRosa and Martinez. 3-1 Indians. Girardi replaces Veras with Damaso Marte, who proceeds to allow seven more runs through a horrid combination of fielding errors, homers, and wildness. When the dust settles, the Indians are leading 10-1.

My understanding of a manager’s job is pretty simple and, I’d imagine, fairly accurate. I think his job is to maximize the team’s chance of winning the current game while balancing that task with the requirements for victories in the future. Basically, his job is to try and win now, but don’t do anything that would really hurt the team in the future either. I’m sure it’s a tough job with a tremendous amount of pressure to perform. I can muster that much sympathy.

With that being said, I don’t understand why Girardi and his peers continually manage their bullpen in a way that clearly hurts the team and, more frustratingly, defies all reason. Girardi should have used Mariano Rivera once DeRosa walked. If not then, certainly once Martinez doubled. Again, I’m positive Girardi’s gut was telling him “this is the game right here” with runners on second and third and no one out. I’m sure of it. It would logically follow that he would insert Rivera into the game, since Rivera is his best reliever and the game’s outcome was in the balance. Clearly, this did not happen. Governed by nothing but provincial, traditional, and illogical thinking, Girardi went to inferior relievers in an attempt to control the damage. He did this because Rivera pitches no inning but the 9th, and he must have a lead to protect instead of one to prevent. Need him earlier than the 9th inning? Like, seriously, unquestionably need him to win the game? No, because it is not the 9th inning.

The overarching implication of modern bullpen management is that the 9th inning – solely because it is the last in the sequence – is inherently more difficult for pitchers than any other frame. The byproduct of this belief was the creation of the “closer,” or, the only reliever with the fortitude to navigate such a pressure-packed situation. The role of the “closer” has, in turn, produced a widespread and unquestioned code of in-game management that regularly hurts teams’ chances of success. Managers simply will not use their “closer” (who is almost always the team’s best reliever) unless the team has a lead in the 9th inning, even if the team desperately needs him. 

Managers need to stop saving their best relievers to protect leads that they might not get. It’s as simple as that. As Baseball Prospectus’ Joe Sheehan said, the first manager to realize and act on this is going to the Hall of Fame.

Classic Bullpen Mismanagement Resurrects (Ha!) On Easter

When I was a child – and maybe for just a bit beyond then – my mother would hide two Easter baskets in the apartment for me and my younger sister to find. Motivated by sheer gluttony and competitive spirit, we would discerningly rampage through each room on our quest for sugar. Inevitably, with a little help from our sympathetic creator (not that creator), we would find the cradles of candy and proceed to trade with one another. White chocolate was usually the first to go. As time has passed, I have noticed that the baskets’ altitude was inversely proportional to our ages. Cabinets and closet shelves were popular hiding spots in our infancy. Later on, low-lying nooks and crannies were more in vogue. It would seem that we came by our competitive spirit honestly.

I mention this because Easter Sunday has always been a day of discovery for me. Yesterday continued that tradition, although in new ways. Expecting the Yankees-Royals game to be rained out, I consented to visit nearby Roosevelt Island with my girlfriend. Neither of us had ever been, and it seemed like a pleasant way to spend a beautiful day. Of course, several text messages from friends revealed that no, it was not raining in Kansas City and yes, baseball was being played. Oops. My girlfriend compassionately suggested that we find a sports bar on the island, but my word was my word. Nevertheless, this resulted in my third noteworthy discovery of the day – there are no such establishments on Roosevelt Island. 

Throughout the afternoon, two loyal friends peppered my phone with game updates, eventually leading to a painfully clear depiction of what was happening. Quite simply, the Yankees’ bullpen was blowing the game. I remained calm (no, really, I have a witness) until my return from the island, when I could carefully examine the box score and play-by-play information. Joba Chamberlain had pitched six strong innings, allowing four hits and one earned run, while striking out five and walking one. Reliever Brian Bruney pitched a perfect 7th inning, after which the score remained 4-3 Yankees. Unfortunately, the 8th inning brought the fourth and final discovery of an otherwise blissful day. Namely, it would appear that major league managers – even those with industrial engineering degrees from Northwestern University – still don’t know how to manage a bullpen effectively.

Now THIS Is How You Use A Bullpen (I’m Looking At You Joe Torre)

Last night, I witnessed easily the most infuriating loss of the Yankees’ dismal season. I mean, this was epically infuriating. Mere days after Torre cost the Yankees the game against the Giants by refusing to pitch Mariano Rivera in a tie game, Torre did the exact same thing against the Orioles.

It was 2-2 in the 9th, thus creating the dreaded scenario in which Torre manages a tie game on the road. Invariably in these games, Torre will resort to mediocre reliever after mediocre reliever in order to preserve the tie, so that the Yankees can score a run, so that Rivera can get a save. This, of course, means that the greatest reliever in baseball history is picking splinters out of his butt on the bench while inferior pitchers give up game-winning runs. Torre never seems to get that – in these situations – the game ends if the other team scores. But that’s cool with Torre. Scott Proctor, Luis Vizcaino, Kyle Farnsworth, and Mike Myers are all clearly better options than that Rivera guy.

Anyway, my beef is that Torre never puts his best reliever (Rivera) in tie games on the road, because he wants to save him for the save situation that may or may not come. Instead of using his best reliever in the most important of situations, he continually turns to worse options and Rivera rarely gets into the game. Also, the Yankees usually lose.

Why am I writing all this? Well, the Red Sox are playing the Mariners tonight in Seattle. It was tied 1-1 in the bottom of the 9th. Red Sox reliever Hideki Okajima opened the inning by allowing a single, a sacrifice bunt, and then another single. Therefore, there were runners on 1st and 3rd with 1 out. Did Terry Francona leave Okajima in, even while knowing that if the Mariners score, the game ends? Nope. He brought in Jonathan Papelbon, his best reliever. Papelbon induced two flyballs, thus ending the inning. Papelbon then proceeded to pitch a perfect 10th inning. He was eventually replaced by Joel Piniero, who gave up a run and lost the game.

The moral of the story is this: it is okay and even preferable to bring in your closer in a tie game on the road. It is the smart tactical move. In this example, Papelbon pitched 1.2 perfect innings, which gave his team a chance to win. In the Torre situation, mediocre relievers pitch imperfect innings, which gives their team less of a chance to win.

Well played, Boston. Well played.

Bob Klapisch Is Panicking

Bob Klapisch is panicking, which is ironic because that’s what he’s accusing the Yankees of doing in bringing up Phil Hughes to pitch Thursday. Hughes – as you may or may not know – is the consensus #1 pitching prospect in baseball today. Klapisch uses this promotion as a way of addressing the Yankees’ shortcomings in general. He has some legitimate concerns, but there are some pretty startling moments of panic:

No one wants to admit they’re panicking, but what else can the Yankees’ summoning of rookie Phil Hughes from Triple-A be except just that — panic, following a disastrous weekend sweep at Fenway?

Disastrous? The Yankees’ starting pitching could not get any worse, Joe Torre is a horrendous manager, no Matsui (for the whole series) and no Damon/Posada for various parts, and it was on the road against a completely healthy Red Sox team (with their three “aces” giving up 15 ER in 20 IP). Final score of the series: 21-17, Boston. And also, it’s April. This was not disastrous.

Everyone is hurt, including Mike Mussina, Carl Pavano and Chien-Ming Wang, who finally comes off the disabled list tonight against Tampa Bay. But the franchise’s foundation was further rocked on Friday when Mariano Rivera blew a disastrous save against the Red Sox, and was clocked at just 88 mph on the radar gun

This is true. Lots of Yankee starters are hurt. Wang comes back tonight, Mussina in a week, and Pavano probably never. The Yankees have replaced them with inferior pitchers (Darrell Rasner, Jeff Karstens, Chase Wright), who have sucked to the point that the bullpen has been overused. This will be very important to remember shortly.

Also, I’m not saying Rivera isn’t declining. He probably is, because he’s old. But to say that “the franchise’s foundation was further rocked” is extreme. Rivera, like every other reliever in the history of baseball, has had bad months before. This season, Rivera has thrown 6 innings. 6. I think making such a sweeping judgment after 6 innings of work is insane. If he had 6 iffy innings in the middle of the season, it’d be a slump. But it’s at the beginning, so he’s falling apart. I get it.

The rest of the bullpen has been so unreliable that Andy Pettitte has already made two relief appearances. The other relievers, it seems, are just waiting for their next flogging, with no cure on the horizon

Okay, Bob, you yourself said that the Yankees’ starting pitching has been atrocious. This means that the bullpen has had to pitch a ton more than usual. Sean Henn, Luis Vizcaino, Scott Proctor, and Brian Bruney are all in the AL’s top ten innings pitched by a reliever this year. It’s because the starting pitching has sucked so far. The Yankee bullpen is not unreliable, nor are they “just waiting for their next flogging”. I know this because I looked it up. The Yankee bullpen is 12th in baseball with a 3.51 ERA, 5th with a .206 BAA, and 7th with a .625 OPS against.

The Yankees – despite having their foundation rocked by 6 iffy innings from Mariano Rivera and obscenely overworked/mismanaged middle relievers – have one of the best bullpens in baseball. You can look it up, Bob.

Hughes has had mixed results in the minors, pitching effectively in his first start, getting roughed up in his second, before finally mixing and matching his weapons to perfection in overwhelming Syracuse.

Philip “Mixed Results” Hughes:

• (2004-2006): 21-7, 2.13 ERA, 0.86 WHIP, 237 IP, 150 H, 6 HR, 269 K, 54 BB, 10.21 K/9
• (2007): 2-1, 3.94 ERA, 0.94 WHIP, 16 IP, 11 H, 0 HR, 17 K, 4 BB, 9.56 K/9

I’m assuming that Bob meant to say that he has had mixed results in AAA so far, but he didn’t say that. He said Hughes has had mixed results in the minor leagues, which is clearly really wrong.

Don’t think people aren’t noticing how vulnerable they are. One major league executive said, “I wouldn’t say this is one of the better Yankee teams of the last few years.”

I agree the Yankees have gotten off to a horrendous start. But again: injured Wang, injured Mussina, permanently injured Pavano, overworked bullpen (that has managed to be effective), injured Matsui, zero production from first base. But it’s way too early to be saying this stuff with this sort of conviction. The Yankees’ team ERA, believe it or not, is 25th in baseball at 4.67. It’s probably going to improve, since everything that could have gone wrong HAS gone wrong. The Yankees are also on pace to score 1044 runs, when no team has scored more than 1000 since the Cleveland Indians in 1999.

Has the Yankees’ starting pitching sucked so far? Yep, sure has. But the melodrama and panic surrounding this is starting to bother me. Look, I’ll eat my hat if the pitching keeps the Yankees from winning 90 games. But I don’t think it will. Bob Klapisch needs to calm down, step back, and think about what he’s writing. The Yankees began the 2005 season with a 11-18 record, and made the playoffs. Relax, and we’ll talk again in a month.